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Abstract
A new protocol for 1-2 (String) Oblivious Transfer is proposed. The protocol uses
5 rounds of message exchange.
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1 Introduction
During a 1-2 (String) Oblivious Transfer protocol, Bob should learn one of two bit strings
provided by Alice, but not both, while Alice should not learn anything about Bob’s choice.
A protocol fulfilling these constraints would be a powerful cryptographic primitive
(cf. [3] for an introduction to the subject).
In this article, we propose a protocol that uses 5 rounds of message exchange.
Since most of the computational part of the protocol takes place in the unit group of
a finite field, we further investigate the question whether Alice or Bob can gain more
information, if it turns out that the computation of discrete logarithms in this group is
easy.
2 The Protocol
Initialisation: Before the actual start of the protocol Alice and Bob agree on a positive
integer n ∈ N, a prime p of size ∼ 2
√
nlogn, a random matrix C = (ci,j)i,j ∈ Fn×np ,
i, j = 1, . . . n, a cryptographic Hash-Function h1 : Fp −→ {0, 1}q and an injective
(polynomial-time computable) One-Way-Function h2 : {0, 1}
q −→ {0, 1}q′ , for integers q
and q′. Here, Fp denotes the finite field with p elements.
Round 1: Alice starts by choosing n random bits t1, . . . , tn, two distinct random
1
elements a, b ∈ Fp, with a 6= −ci,j 6= b for i, j = 1, . . . , n, two distinct random elements
αa, αb ∈ F×p of order p − 1 (i.e. each of these elements is a generator of the unit group
F
×
p := Fp − {0}) and two random permutations σa, σb on the set {1, . . . , n}. She then
computes, for j = 1, . . . , n,
µj,a := α
σa(j)
a
n∏
i=1
(a + ci,j)
ti and µj,b := α
σb(j)
b
n∏
i=1
(b+ ci,j)
ti (1)
and sends ((µj,a)j, (µj,b)j) to Bob.
Round 2: Bob chooses n random bits s1, . . . , sn. He computes
τA,a :=
n∏
j=1
µ
sj
j,a and τA,b :=
n∏
j=1
µ
sj
j,b (2)
and sends (τA,a, τA,b) to Alice.
Round 3: Alice chooses two (random) bit strings ma, mb of size q (the messages) and
computes za := h2(ma) and zb := h2(mb). She then computes, for k = 1, . . . ,
n(n−1)
2 ,
sk,a := h1
(
α−ka τA,a
)
⊕ma and sk,b := h1
(
α−kb τA,b
)
⊕mb, (3)
where ⊕ denotes the XOR-function, and sends ((sk,a)k, (sk,b)k, a, b, za, zb) to Bob.
Round 4: Bob chooses a random element β ∈ F×p of order p − 1, a random per-
mutaion ρ on the set {1, . . . , n} and an element d ∈ {a, b}. He then computes, for
i = 1, . . . , n,
νi := β
ρ(i)
n∏
j=1
(d+ ci,j)
sj (4)
and sends (νi)i to Alice.
Round 5: Alice computes
τB :=
n∏
i=1
νtii (5)
and sends τB to Bob.
Finally, Bob computes for r = 1, . . . , n(n−1)s the list (β
−rτB)r until he finds r0 and k0 such
that h2(h1(β
−r0τB)⊕ sk0,d) = zd, which gives him the message md = h1(β−r0τB)⊕ sk0,d.
2
3 Analysis
The following theorem states the correctness of the protocol and (roughly) counts the
computational cost for both sides (for simplicity, we count addition and multiplication in
Fp as one elementary operation and leave aside the randomized selection process).
Theorem 1 At the end of the protocol, Bob is in possession of the message he asked for.
The computational cost for Alice equals O(n2 · (cost of h1)) elementary operations, while
on Bob’s side it sums up to O(n2 · (cost of h1) + n4 · (cost of h2)).
Proof. The first statement of the theorem is easily seen to be true, since
τA,d = α
k′
d
n∏
i,j=1
(d + ci,j)
tisj (6)
and respectively
τB = β
r′
n∏
i,j=1
(d+ ci,j)
tisj , (7)
with d ∈ {a, b} and 1 6 k′, r′ 6 n(n − 1)/2. The calculation of the computational cost is
straightforward. 
We now turn to the two fundamental questions for this protocol. For this, we de-
fine the function f(y) :=
∏
i,j(y+ ci,j)
tisj . It is clear that, for d ∈ {a, b}, the knowledge of
f(d) leads to the knowledge of the message md.
Q1: Can Alice efficiently decide whether Bob chose d = a?
Q2: Can Bob, who knows f(d), efficiently compute f(a + b− d)?
So far, the author of this article is not aware of any polynomial time algorithm
that would answer one of these questions with “yes”.
In the following we shall see that even the ability to efficiently compute discrete
logarithms in F×p does not seem to help much.
So, from now on we will assume that Alice and Bob can compute discrete loga-
rithms in F×p efficiently. To start with Bob (i.e. Q2) it is easily seen that the knowledge
of Alice’s secret bits t1, . . . , tn immediately gives him both messages ma and mb (he can
compute f(a) and f(b)). To get these bits, Bob can choose a generator g of the group F×p
and try to solve the equation (cf. (5))
x1δg(ν1) + · · · + xnδg(νn) ≡ δg(τB) mod p− 1, (8)
3
where δg(·) denotes the discrete logarithm function with respect to g. Since there are
2n ways to select the values of the xi’s, there are, heuristcally speaking, approximately
2n−logp ∼ 2n(1−
√
logn/n) solutions to equation (8). Now suppose that Bob knows f(a). He
then can compute αk
′
a , with an unknown positive integer k
′ 6 n(n−1)/2. Suppose further
that he somehow manages to determine αa (or at least a list of possible candidates for
αa). Since gcd(δq(αa), p − 1) = 1 this leads (cf. (1)) in general to the following
Challenge 1 Given n ∈ N, a prime p of size ∼ 2
√
nlogn, a matrix (ei,j)i,j=1,...,n with
integer coefficients and a list of integers (fj)j=1,...,n, compute x1, . . . , xn, with xi ∈ {0, 1},
and a permutation pi on the set {1, . . . , n} such that
x1e1,1+ . . . + xne1,n+ pi(1) ≡ f1 mod p− 1
x1e2,1+ . . . + xne2,n+ pi(2) ≡ f2 mod p− 1
...
x1en,1+ . . . + xnen,n+ pi(n) ≡ fn mod p− 1.
Again, the author of these lines is not aware of any efficient method that solves this
challenge.
Now, Alice’s story (Q1) is pretty much the same. In the end, Alice finds herself
confronted with a decision version of Challenge 1, but as is easily seen, an algorithm that
can decide in polynomial time whether a solution exists can also be used to efficiently
compute a solution.
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